Denver Law Review
Volume 24

Issue 5

Article 4

January 1947

Is Residence of the Plaintiff, in Colorado, Necessary to Support a
Divorce Action Based on Cruelty within the State, if Defendant Is a
Resident of Colorado?
Edwin M. Sears

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Edwin M. Sears, Is Residence of the Plaintiff, in Colorado, Necessary to Support a Divorce Action Based
on Cruelty within the State, if Defendant Is a Resident of Colorado?, 24 Dicta 110 (1947).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

DICTA
Judicial
County

District

No. P. M.

Park ............ 11
Phillips .......... -13

Vocation

Holyoke
Haxtun
Lamar

Prowers ............ 15
Pueblo ............ 10
San Miguel .... 7

1
2

Sedgwick ........ 13
Summit ........_ 5
Teller .............. 4

1
1
2

Weld

Location

.............. 8

*5

Yuma .............. 13

2

Holly
Pueblo
Telluride
Norwood
Julesburg
Breckenridge
Victor
Cripple Creek
Greeley
Eaton
Ault
Windsor
Fort Lupton
Wray

Unknown
Unknown
JP-former farmer and old age
pensioner
Retired
Lawyer
Undertaker and furniture store
Unknown
JP. and operator of service station
Old age pensioner, prospector
City clerk and JP
City clerk
Lawyer
JP and real estate and insurance
JP and real estate and insurance
JP and real estate and insurance
JP, employee of sugar company
1 retired, 1 insurance business

* Due to telephone strike, unable to determine if there are more police magistrates in county.

Is Residence of the Plaintiff, in Colorado, Necessary to Support a Divorce Action Based on Cruelty
Within the State, If Defendant Is a Resident
of Colorado?
By EDWIN M. SEARS*
Attorneys are in doubt regarding the answer to the title question. The
Colorado Supreme Court has not spoken on it. It is the purpose of this paper
to prove that the answer should be in the negative.

I
It seems necessary, first, to allay the apprehension that under the construction of the Colorado divorce statutes, as here proposed, Colorado divorces

could be granted, if the cruelty complained of occurred in this state, though
none of the parties be here domiciled. If section 6 of the statute were so construed, then, it might be said, no residence requirement at all exists as to
either party, and Colorado could become the Mecca of divorce seekers-a
result clearly abhorred by our courts (Sedgwick vs. Sedgwick, 50 Colo. 164,
169).
But such would not be the effect of the above proposition. Our statute
clearly, though by implication, requires the residence in the state of one party
*Of the Denver bar.
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to the action as prerequisite of divorce jurisdiction. This follows from the
second proviso of section 6, stating that the suit must be brought in the court
of either plaintiff's or defendant's residence. While this provision purports
to relate to venue rather than jurisdiction, it must be remembered that our
Supreme Court considers venue rules in the divorce statutes, to some extent
at least, as jurisdictional (Branch vs. Branch, 30 Colo. 499, 506). It is all
the more appropriate and mandatory to find in this second proviso in section
6, a statutory rule to the effect that Colorado requires residence in this state
of at least one party to a divorce action as a basis for divorce jurisdiction.
This rule would prevent any undue expansion of the proposition argued in
this article: that no residence of the plaintiff in this state is necessary where
he sues on the ground of cruelty committed in Colorado, and if the defendant's residence is here.
II
As the question before us is that of jurisdiction, it should be pointed
out that jurisdiction means "power", and in this context: "power to grant
a divorce". (Williams vs. North Carolina, 65 Sup. Ct. 1092, par. 5 of opinion, 89 Law Ed. 1123, 1126). In this second Williams case, just cited, the
U. S. Supreme Court said, (par. 5 of the opinion): "The domicile of one
spouse within a state gives power to that state to dissolve a marriage wherever
contracted."
It would seem to follow that a Colorado court has jurisdiction in this
sense of "power" to grant a divorce to non-resident plaintiff against a resident
defendant on the ground of cruelty committed within this state.
III
Whatever residence requirement may be thought to exist cannot be deduced from any vague ius naturae, or from any a priori postulate of such
residence, but must follow from any one of the following sources:
The full faith and credit or the due process clause of the constitution,
the common law in the sense of judge-made rules, or our divorce statute. If
residence of the plaintiff is not required by any of these, then residence of
the plaintiff is not necessary. It cannot be interpolated from any other source
because there is none.
Residence of the plaintiff is not required under the full faith and credit
clause as the above quoted par. 5 of the Williams case proves. Nevada divorces
need not be recognized abroad, under that case, only because and if neither
party is a resident of the state granting the divorce.
The due process clause of the constitution does not set up a domicile
requirement in the plaintiff to a divorce action. This follows from the Williams case, itself, as the foreign recognition problem, there dealt with, could
not even come up unless the Nevada judgment withstood the test of due
process. (See Frankfurter, concurring in the first Williams case 317 U.S.
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287, 306; also Prof. Powell, 58 Harvard Law Review [1945] note 139, p.
984).
The common law does not make residence of the plaintiff a prerequisite
to a divorce action. Its jurisdictional requirements are satisfied if one party
resides within the state granting the divorce.
Madden, Domestic Relations (1931) p. 312
Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (1927) p. 290
Schouler, Divorce Manual (1944) sec. 16
Restatement Conflict of Laws, Sect. 113a 1 and 111, and b.
Nelson, on Divorce (1945) par. 21.12
Restatement, Judgments, par. 33(a)

IV
The fact that so many decided divorce cases deal with plaintiff's, and so
few with defendant's residence, might make plaintiff's residence appear of
preponderant importance in such an action. But that phenomenon is easily
explained. In the typical situation inviting any inquiry into jurisdiction, a
plaintiff who claims to be a resident sues a spouse who admittedly is not a
resident of the forum state. In this situation, clearly, the court must find
residence of the plaintiff, or else it cannot have jurisdiction over the "res",
the status of the spouses, as neither one would reside at the forum.
Finding residence of the plaintiff in this common situation is necessary
not because residence of the plaintiff, but because residence of one spouse is
a jurisdictional fact, and because the defendant in this common situation,
admittedly, is not a resident of the forum state.

V
Since, then, residence of the plaintiff in a divorce action is not necessary
under any of the rules discussed under III and IV above, the only remaining
question is whether such requirement is set up by our divorce statute. The
answer should be in the negative.
(1) The only statutory provision in Colorado, setting up any requirement of residence is section 6, chapter 56, C.S.A. In its first sentence, this
section ordains one year residence of the plaintiff as a prerequisite to a divorce
action; but "this section" shall not be applicable in divorce cases based on
cruelty committed in Colorado,
The expression "this section" pnust refer to the preceding sentence, and
it must refer to the whole of it. It cannot, grammatically, refer to one part,
but not to another. It cannot, even in purely philological contemplation, be
held to rule out the "one year", and yet sustain the "residence" requirement.
The part of section 6 declared to be inapplicable in "this section", i.e. its
first sentence, no more, and particularly, no less. In none of the numerous
cases cited in W and P, Perm. Ed., vol. 38, p. 450, et seq. has 'the expression
"this section" been construed not to refer to the whole of the preceding subdivision.
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The correctness of this interpretation is shown by a certain practice
followed in all divisions of the Denver District Court. It is the Generally
Followed Practice to Allow Proof of Plaintiff's Residence in Intra-State
Cruelty cases by Means Other Than Testimony of a Third Person. If the first
proviso of section 6 eliminated the "one year" residence requirement only,
but not the other elements contained in the first sentence of section 6, then,
clearly, residence of the plaintiff would have to be established in all cases by
testimony of a witness other than the plaintiff. The general practice dispensing with such evidence in cruelty cases is a clear indication that the first
proviso is thought to qualify the initial rule in section 6 in toto, not only
as to the "one year" element.
The appropriateness of this practice, and of the interpretation of section
6 here advocated, also follows from the nature of a "proviso". Bouvier (Law
Dictionary) states: "The purpose of a proviso is to except the clause covered
,by it from the provisions of a statute, or to qualify the operation of a statute".
WAile definitions sunt periculosae, and while a proviso may at times operate
in a different way, it seems worth noting that under the above definition, and
absent any reasons to qualify its import here, the first sentence of section 6
is superseded by this first proviso. The effect of it, then, is to do away with
sentence 1 in toto, thereby eliminating any residence requirement in the
plaintiff in case of cruelty committed in Colorado, but leaving, of course,
intact the rule requiring residence of at least one party to a divorce action in
this state.
(2) Public policy does not argue against this theory which considers
the whole of the first sentence in section 6 inapplicable to intra-state cruelty
cases. Colorado's public policy to prevent "temporary" residents from obtaining divorces in this state (Sedgwick vs. Sedgwick, 50 Colo. 164, 169) is
clearly not directed at situations where Colorado has a natural connection
with the matrimonial relationship of the parties, through residence of the
defendant and the locus delicti commissi. That policy has, moreover, been
tempered, in intra-state cruelty cases, by the express elimination of the one
year requirement. A plaintiff could admittedly sue on cruelty, under the
first proviso of section 6, the very minute after having established a possibly
rather tenuous residence here; and he could then sue even a non-resident
spouse. Public policy clearly permits such divorce suit operating on an
actually very casual relation of the spouses to Colorado. It is'difficult to
see why this public policy should object to a Colorado divorce action where
the spouses' relation to Colorado, through defendant's residence and misconduct, is, by comparison, intimate, and where both parties are personally
under the jurisdiction of the Court, the plaintiff by invoking it, and the
defendant by being a Colorado resident.
(3) The wording of the Colorado statute, it has been shown, supports
the thesis of this paper, and public policy does not oppose it. This latter is

DICTA

true, particularly, because the theory here advocated will not result in a
flood of divorces sought by visitors to this state. Residence of one of the
spouses is necessary, under the second proviso of section 6, to give a Colorado
court divorce jurisdiction. But it is the thesis of this article that such residence
of one spouse is sufficient in an intra-state cruelty case, whether that spouse
be the plaintiff or the defendant.
(4) No cases but one have been found where a non-resident plaintiff
sues a resident defendant on the ground of cruelty committed within the
state, under a statute similar to ours. Some cases declare the occurrence
within the state of misconduct, without residence of any of the spouses, a
sufficient basis of divorce jurisdiction (see note 59 LRA p. 154), others deny
that (17 A.J. sect. 245; 27 C.J.S. sec. 80 note 63). But this, obviously, is
not our question, because we assume the defendant to be a resident of Colorado.
The one case in point is Kokinakis vs. Kokinakis, 180 U.S.W. 2nd, 243
(Mo).
There a soldier stationed in Missouri, whose residence in Missouri was
at least questionable, sued his spouse, a resident of Missouri, in that state on
the ground of cruelty committed therein. The court held for the plaintiff,
on the assumption of plaintiff's non-residence. The court said under (3):
"We do not need to put plaintiff's right to a divorce action upon his residence".
The applicable Missouri statute (quoted from Martindale-Hubbell) reads:
"No person who has not resided in the state for one year next before filing
of the petition is entitled-to a divorce unless the offense or injury occurred
within the state, (or while one party or both parties resided in the state)"
(Parentheses ours).
The similarity of this statute to ours is fairly obvious up to that part
which above is put in parentheses. This clause in parentheses must be disregarded for purposes of comparison with our statute because it deals with a
situation not here involved. The clause in parentheses clearly refers to
offenses which occurred outside the state. This follows from an application
of elementary rules of construction, as the clause in parentheses follows that
dealing with offenses within Missouri. The purpose of the clause in parentheses is to allow divorce actions in Missouri without one year residence of
the plaintiff though the offenses occurred outside the state, if one party
resided in Missouri at the time the acts of cruelty' occurred. The Missouri
statute, in other words, does away with the one year residence requirement
not only in case of intra-state cruelty, but also if the cruelty is committed
outside the state if one of the parties then resides in Missouri. The Missouri
statute does not however say anything about the dispensability with plaintiff's residence at the time the action is brought. On this point, the Missouri
as well as the Colorado statute are silent except insofar as they declare the

DICTA

general rule of one year's residence inapplicable. The persuasiveness of the
Kokinakis case can therefore not be discredited on the ground of substantial
differences of the Missouri and the Colorado statutes.
When considering offenses within Missouri, the Missouri courts are
faced with a statute which, like ours in effect, says: A plaintiff in a divorce
action must have been a resident of the state for one year except where the
offense occurred within the state. The only difference between the Missouri
and our statute insofar is that the latter introduces the differential treatment
of intra-state cruelty cases with the. words "provided that this section shall
not affect" them, while the Missouri statute ordains the general rule of one
year residence "unless" the offense occurred in the state. Under either statute,
we have a general rule of one year residence, followed by a qualification regarding intra-state cruelty cases.
Under either statute, the courts are faced, therefore, with the problem
treated in this article: whether the qualification following the rule eliminates
the "one year" requirement only of the rule, or whether it eliminates it in
toto, so as to make residence of the plaintiff in intra-state cruelty cases entirely unnecessary.
On this precise question, the Missouri case deals with the identical problem now before us. And the Missouri holding to the effect that residence of
plaintiff is not required in intra-state cruelty cases should, therefore, be persuasive to a Colorado court.
VI
Detailed analysis has led to the conclusion that neither our statute nor
any other rule of law require plaintiff's residence in Colorado as a prerequisite
to tdivorce action against a resident defendant based on cruelty committed
widhin the state. The same result is reached if the problem is tested against
fuidamental, rational, "first" principles.
The purpose of all residence requirements in divorce actions is to assure
power of the court over the res, the martial relationship, and over the parties
to the action. This power of the court is undeniably present when a resident
plaintiff-be his residence ever so short-sues a non-resident defendant on
cruelty committed within the state even though the defendant be served by
publication. The power of the court in the situation dealt with in this paper
(where a non-resident plaintiff sues a resident defendant on the ground of
intra-state cruelty) seems much more direct and the nexus much closer than
in the typical example of the preceding sentence.
The court here has power over the res as the defendant is a resident,
and the latter's marital relationship therefore clearly subject to the power of
the Colorado court. Since there can be no marital relationship except between
two persons, power of the court over defendant's marriage necessarily implies
that over the plaintiff's. (See Goodrich, on Conflicts of Law, 1927, p. 292,
bottom). A Colorado court, therefore, has equal power over the status of
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the parties to a divorce action regardless of whether the resident or the nonresident spouse brings suit.
Power of the Colorado court over the persons is, clearly, stronger in the
case here dealt with, than in the typical example in the paragraph before
last. In that example, the court has power over one party only, the plaintiff.
Here, jurisdiction over the persons is perfect as the defendant resides here,
and as the plaintiff submits himself by invoking the Colorado court's powers.
The Colorado Supreme Court has never held that Colorado courts have
no power to grant a divorce in this situation. The much quoted statement,
"Residence is jurisdictional and cannot be waived by the parties" (Branch
vs. Branch, 30 Colo. 499, 506) does not argue against the theory here developed. In the Branch case, the plaintiff sued in a county where neither he
nor the defendant resided. It is in this context that this statement must be
read and understood. It did not mean to, and does not, say that a non,
resident plaintiff may not sue a resident defendant on grounds of cruelty
committed in this state.
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